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Introduction 
Radical Islamic movements in the Muslim world are a critical threat to our nation and our allies. 
These have been present in continental Eurasia and Africa for various decades, and have 
become an emerging threat in Southeast Asia. This has been particularly the case in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines, three regional neighbors with significant Muslim populations. 
The severe impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on these nations’ economies, domestic 
ethnic and religious conflicts (1999-2001) and the popular opposition to the GWOT campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq seemed to create the right atmosphere for radical Islamic organizations to 
flourish. However, against expectation these three nations have instead gained momentum 
towards economic recovery, democratization and religious tolerance. 
In this article I will discuss and analyze the diverse underlying reasons why the Indonesian, 
Malaysian and Philippine people have not been receptive to imposing Shariah Law, and reject the 
idea of establishing Islamic states and caliphates.  
Malay Culture in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 
I define the Malay culture of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines as the Austronesian culture 
and people that forms the majority of the population in these three nations. Today these people 
encompass three different nationalities and speak different languages while composing one race. 
Traditional Malay culture possesses more egalitarian characteristics across genders than in the 
rest of the Muslim world. Women enjoy a higher status in the Malay Southeast Asian societies 
while Middle Eastern societies are more patriarchic and authoritarian.[1] According to the United 
Nations mission to Indonesia in 2002, there is an interpretation of Islam which allows egalitarian 
education for both genders. Also, 48% of Indonesian primary, secondary and university students 
are girls, depicting a larger cultural acceptance towards education for women.[2] This reflects in 
the significant participation of women in these nations’ Islamic organizations. 
It is important to mention that matriarchic pre-Islamic cultures within these nations adopted Islam 
with minimal impacts to their customs. The Minangkabau people of coastal Indonesia, one of the 
largest ethnic groups in the archipelago, have maintained a heavily female dominated and 
influenced culture while practicing Islam.[3] It is important to note that Islam first arrived to these 
coastal regions, establishing an earlier foothold in these areas prior to its spread in the inner 
lands. 
In Malay cultures egalitarian treatment across the genders can be found at the children’s age, 
where gender differences are virtually non-existent.[4] Many Sufi educational institutions across 
these nations have registered to have a 40 to 60 percent of female members.[5] Islamic boarding 
schools dedicated to the study of Islam and other secular studies show similar representation. 
This also includes equal gender access to secular and religious education within national secular 
institutions.[6] It is important to mention that Christians (Catholics and Protestant), Buddhists and 
Hindus are also entitled to religious education of their respective faiths according to national 
standards.[7] 
Radical Islamic influences clash with cultural principles of the region which have extensive roots 
and a more extensive history. Indonesia, the largest Muslim populated nation in the world, has 
opted to form secular governments and constitutions which recognize more egalitarian practices 
across the genders. The Malaysian government has embraced political Islam to a larger extent 
than Indonesia while remaining secular. On September 29, 2001 the Malay government made a 
claim that Malaysia was already an Islamic state, while emphasizing the unnecessary 
implementation of Shariah Law. In the Philippine Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM), the application of Shariah Law only applies exclusively to Muslims and in limited 
situations.  
Arrival of Islam to Insular Southeast Asia 
Islam arrived peacefully to Southeast Asia, unlike in Africa and continental Eurasia. Military 
conquest at the hands of Arabian armies (first wave of Islam) Islamized the societies of the 
Iberian Peninsula, the Middle East and North Africa while tolerating existing Christian and Judaic 
populations. Turkic tribes and the Ottomans spread the Islamic faith (second wave of Islam) 
through the Balkans, Central and South Asia in more ruthless expeditions across the continent.[8] 
The encountered Hindu and Buddhist populations did not receive the same protection as the 
Christians and Jews found by the Arabs, as the former believers are not considered to be People 
of the Book per the Quran (2:62; 6:69 & 22:22). 
In the thirteenth century, merchants and traders from the South Asian subcontinent arrived in 
Southeast Asia with peaceful objectives of establishing commercial links. These continental 
merchants built mosques in the new lands and provided support for emerging Muslim societies. 
They became members of the local ruling elites via marriage, further spreading the faith into the 
local population. Once these ruling strata of society and the commercial circles were converted, it 
became an incentive for locals to convert to Islam, thus facilitating trade and other business 
relationships.[9] 
Native tradesmen found it beneficial to convert to Islam, as lucrative trade became almost 
exclusive to Muslim communities.[10] Locals also found that sharing Islam would include them 
within a circle of trust among tradesmen, furthermore, interest free loans were only available 
among Muslims.[11] Local monarchs also encouraged Islamic conversion by promoting land 
ownership exclusively to Muslims.[12] The settling of South Asian Muslim immigrants in these 
archipelagos also contributed to the spread of Islam throughout present day Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines. 
These new beliefs combined with already existing local traditions (Hindu, Buddhist and 
preexisting animist beliefs) introduced the present unique Islamic practices of these nations. This 
merging of foreign with domestic practices developed the “Southeast Asian version of Islam,” a 
source of much debate and friction between Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian religious 
scholars. Presently, most Islamic literature in Southeast Asia is locally produced and distributed, 
further strengthening its unique characteristics.[13] 
Existing Sufi influences strengthen the traditional pre-Islamic mystic beliefs in the 
archipelagos.[14] Traditional, cultural and religious practices are still strong in the region even 
after years of exposure to stringent Islam as a result of Islamic NGOs and the more frequented 
pilgrimage to Mecca since the Industrial Revolution. 
Islam in Insular Southeast Asia 
The most common form of Islam in Southeast Asia is the Shafii school of jurisprudence, which 
derives from Sunni Islam. This school emerged as a result of conflicts between scholars who 
wanted to strictly adhere to the teachings of the prophet and those who emphasized the use of 
analogical reasoning. It identifies four legal sources also known as the Usul al-Fiqh. These are 
the Quran, the Sunnah, the community consensus (ijma) and analogical reasoning (qiyas). 
This Shafii understanding of community is the congregation of members of an actual community, 
not a designated body of Islamic scholars unlike in other forms of Sunni Islam, adding a key level 
of flexibility. This unique understanding of “community” permitted the inclusion of local pre-Islamic 
traditions in Islamic jurisprudence. This blend of pre-Islamic traditions and Shafii practices gave 
way to today’s traditionalist Islamic school in Southeast Asia, which is significantly different from 
stringent African and continental Asian practices.[15]  
Islamic Modernism 
Southeast Asia experienced a pattern of Islamic revival which is reflected in the increasing 
number of mosques and the enforcement of Islamic attire for both men and women throughout 
these nations.[16] Sufism has been part of this revival, a mystical and inner-spiritual dimension of 
Islam which is considered by many Islamic Middle Eastern scholars as being outside of the true 
path of Islam.[17] This dimension of Islam has also experienced an increase in followers from all 
social strata and both genders.[18] 
Islamic modernist movements allowed religious and secular education outside of religious 
institutions, undermining the position of traditionalist religious leaders. This education has also 
been characterized for fomenting pluralism, ethnic/religious tolerance, and English language 
education as well as technical and vocational skills.[19] Student body leadership positions within 
these institutions are obtained via elections, exposing the students to democratic processes at a 
young age. 
It is imperative to mention that more radical Islamic Wahhabi influences did not arrive into the 
region until the end of last century.[20] However, important Islamic non-political organizations 
such as Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, and the present government in Malaysia were successful 
in cementing the belief that Islam needs modernization, as its applicability faces today’s 
challenges of society’s modernization and technological advancement.[21] Therefore, Shariah 
Law must be adjusted before it is applied to today’s lifestyles. Malaysia, a member of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference with 57 other nations, professes the ability of Muslim nations 
to prosper economically while adhering to principles of religious tolerance and social development. 
Islam and Political Activity in Southeast Asia 
In Indonesia, post-Suharto era Islamic friendly parties vary in a larger spectrum of proposed Islam 
implementation policies. Within this new political range, newer parties intend to implement Islamic 
ideas in government policy without changing the secular foundation of the nation. 
The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 gave way to the emergence of several Islamic friendly 
parties. These are catalogued under Islamist, Islamic-inclusive and secular-inclusive parties, all 
three uphold Muslim aspirations.[22] Islamist parties pursue the formal adoption of Shariah Law 
into the Indonesian constitution, turning Indonesia into an Islamic state. Islamic-inclusive parties 
draw their support from Islamic organizations while not emphasizing an Islam-based agenda. 
These parties also reject the idea of adopting Shariah Law as part of the nation’s constitution, 
however they still represent popular Muslim intentions.[23] 
Secular-inclusive parties consider the Indonesian constitution as compatible with Islamic tradition. 
However, these parties emphasize the urge of the population to construct an Islamic society 
without declaring an Islamic fundamentalist state.[24] It is also worth mentioning the increasing 
political participation and acceptance of Christian parties within the Indonesian political 
environment. This more secular approach towards politics, while still embracing Islamic ideas to a 
very limited extent, allowed these more secular Islamic friendly parties in Indonesia to win over 
40% of the votes in the 1999 elections. On the other hand, the more hardline Islamist parties 
captured 14% of the votes. 
Indonesian voting history does not match expressed opinion regarding the implementation of 
Shariah Law and the establishment of an Islamic state. A national survey made in 2002 showed 
that 67% of Muslims desire an Islamic government, and 70.8% agree that the nation’s Muslim 
population should abide by Shariah Law. However, less than 13% would like to see the state 
enforce fasting and the five daily prayers. This was further complicated by the popular desire to 
implement laws based on Islamic principles while simultaneously opposing Islamist proposals for 
women-restrictive measures.[25] 
In Malaysia this is reflected by the Muslim population’s desire to seek pluralism, social and 
economic modernity while simultaneously placing increasing value to Islamic practices and 
spiritualism.[26] Malaysia has declared itself as a democratic, secular multi-religious state while 
adhering to Islamic principles.[27] This is a result to the government’s response to Malaysia’s 
Islamic revival movement of the 1970s known as the Dakwah, which forced the government to 
adopt more Islamic oriented programs in the nation while promoting political and economic 
progress.[28] The government introduced Islamic friendly policy while simultaneously redefining 
national identity and culture around Islamic principles.[29] As a result, today’s Malaysian society 
reflects firm beliefs that radicalism can be combated through good governance, democracy and 
the improvement of quality of life throughout the nation.[30] 
In the Philippines, initial separatist movements such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
were able to engage in successful diplomatic dialogue with Manila, achieving their goal for more 
regional autonomy and renouncing to arms. Today, the majority of the ARMM’s population agrees 
that this region should be ruled by an Islamic government while maintaining its present status 
within the Republic of the Philippines according to a survey conducted in 2008.[31] However, this 
same survey showed that 64% of the surveyed group understands the concept of an Islamic 
government as an administration which embraces Islamic values as opposed to a ruling body of 
Islamic scholars. Furthermore, this survey also found that 71% of the surveyed group is satisfied 
with the democratic governments of the ARMM and the Philippines. 
Democracy and Economic Development 
It is important to understand that Islamic radicalism did not become a threat to the West until the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979; until then, nationalist movements were common across the Muslim 
world. However, even as the Iranian revolution rallied under Islamic fundamentalist ideals, the 
overthrow of the Shah was mostly due to the regime’s economic and political failures instead of 
theological rivalries.[32] 
Central Asian, Middle Eastern and North African nations which have seen the emergence of 
radical Islamic movements have experienced political and economic turmoil, creating an ideal 
environment for these groups to flourish. In contrast Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have 
experienced a brighter history in economic and political development. The secular nature of these 
nations’ Muslim populations has facilitated the formation and support of democratic regimes and 
high economic growth.[33] 
Upon independence these nations embarked on a natural resource export economy, which 
evolved to industry, followed by manufacturing and have presently developed a strong service 
market. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were among the founding members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a community comprising the principles of 
political/security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation per the Bali Concord II of 2003.[34] 
The economic prosperity of the Southeast Asian region along with the strong and peaceful 
interstate relations have not provided the necessary soil needed for the acceptance and spread of 
radical Islamic ideology. 
According to the Failed State Index of 2007, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines figure 
among the more stable nations with stronger institutions than fellow Muslim countries in Central 
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.[35] Per the World Bank’s list of nations according to 
Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity), Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are 
among the top 35 nations (out of 183 countries) along with several Western powers. Meanwhile, 
27 fellow Muslim nations in Africa and continental Asia haves lower rankings, from Bangladesh 
(48) to Djibouti (161).[36] 
Radical Islam, a Foreign Movement  
Over one thousand Southeast Asians fought in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet jihad from 1979 
to 1989. Hundreds more were reported living in Afghanistan as fighters during the following 
Taliban regime and in Pakistan’s madrassas as Islamic scholars.[37] Their time in Central Asia 
allowed these fighters to adopt more radical Islamic beliefs and establish connections with other 
radicals in Southeast Asia and the world. This developed necessary networks, facilitating funding 
and links with other regional extremists and Al-Qaeda. 
These mujahedeen fighters who returned to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines brought 
lethal training and radical rhetoric. They established radical Islamic schools and founded radical 
Islamic organizations, spreading their teachings in Southeast Asia. The Kumpulan Mujahidin 
Malaysia (KMM) is a perfect example of this phenomenon; it was founded by Zainon Ismail, a 
former mujahedeen fighter in the Soviet-Afghan conflict.[38] Jemmah Islamiyah (JI) of Indonesia 
was founded by Abu Bakar Bashir, Hambali and Abdullah Sungkar, the latter two were former 
veterans of the Soviet- Afghan conflict. Al-Qaeda established its presence in Southeast Asia via 
the Philippines’ Abu Sayaff Group (ASG), assuring a foothold in the region and expanding its 
jihadist efforts. 
These organizations’ recruits are students in madrassas where more radical forms of Islam are 
taught. These new students tend to come from lower classes, many of them from disadvantaged 
social and economic backgrounds as well as the unemployed. The targeted individuals are easily 
convinced that their situation is due to the negligent attitude of their governments towards 
Muslims due to “anti-Islamic principles” such as democracy. These ideals are based on the 
principles that Islam is being subdued by a Judeo-Christian conspiracy via economic and political 
means, and current Islamic leaders have been polluted by non-Islamic ideals drawing them away 
from the pillars of the faith. Some of these Islamic radical groups desire to lead their nations into 
the “right path of Islam,” establishing Shariah Law and recovering the true essence of Islam also 
known as salafism.[39] 
Some of these regional radical organizations were founded outside of Southeast Asia such as the 
Philippines’ Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG), which was founded in Egypt and Hizbut Tahrir 
(HT), an Indonesian radical group founded in Jerusalem by Palestinians and later exported to 
Southeast Asia.[40]  
Conclusion 
The strong Malay, Buddhist and Hindu traditions of Indonesia and surrounding nations have been 
able to remain deeply rooted in today’s society. This was made possible through the late arrival of 
Islam, which favored conversion due to financial motives instead of violent invasions such as 
those that took place throughout continental Asia and Africa. A key factor is the tolerant and 
pluralist aspect of Islam in Southeast Asia, which reflects the characteristics of the Shafii school 
of jurisprudence. This school’s definition of ijma rests the responsibility of this community 
reasoning on the local allowing pre-Islamic influences to have an impact on daily Islamic practices. 
This is further reflected in the nature of the modernist and traditionalist Islamic movements which 
foster cooperation with members of other faiths.[41] Regional Islamic modernist organizations 
preach pluralism and the need to adapt Islamic practices to today’s modern society. It is important 
to emphasize that the region’s Islamic traditionalists are a relatively moderate movement when 
compared to more hard line traditionalists in Africa and continental Eurasia. Traditionalist 
movements such as Indonesia’s Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) emphasize and promote the loving and 
peaceful nature of Islam, attempting to dissociate the faith from violent stereotypes. In September 
2008, the NU rejected the potential sweeps at the hands of radical Islamic groups during 
Ramadan.[42] The NU emphasized that any police action against private establishments such as 
bars and nightclubs for not observing this holy month is the responsibility of local law enforcement 
agencies instead of religious organizations throughout the country. 
Newly arrived radical Islamic groups faced this existing moderate and progressive Islamic base in 
Southeast Asia which has a longer and deeper history. Also, these groups are currently struggling 
to obtain support in progressive and democratic nations which have experienced economic 
progress. This was evident when the popular reaction in Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern 
Philippines against the American-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq failed to produce the 
same results as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1970s. The radical Islamic groups failed 
to recruit volunteers to fight abroad as mujahedeen.[43] The general sentiment among the 
population was against the American actions; however, this was demonstrated in a peaceful 
manner. 
Even though the present situation in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines does not provide the 
support for radical Islamic movements, immunity is not assured. Economic decline in the resent 
past has fueled ethnic and religious tensions which have cost thousands of lives. While it is hard 
to change cultures and religious history, economic reality is still an important variable which could 
change these nations’ governments. It is necessary to understand that these self-supporting 
factors may provide the needed stability in the future and become the basis for the further 
strengthening of secular governments in Southeast Asia. This may be a model which may be 
extended into fellow Eurasian and North African Muslim nations. However, a significant disruption 
resulting in the decline of living standards throughout Southeast Asia could tilt the balance in an 
unfavorable way, plunging these nations into chaos and providing the support radical Islamic 
groups have long waited for.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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